possible. After the war, the story continues, Israeli leaders sought peace their heart and all their might but there was no one to talk to on the other s intransigence was alone responsible for the political deadlock, which was not ken until President Anwar Sadat's visit to Jerusalem thirty years later.
This conventional Zionist account or old history of the 1948 war displays a n of features. In the first place, it is not history in the proper sense of the wor of the voluminous literature on the war was written not by professional histor by participants, by politicians, soldiers, official historians, and a large host pathetic chroniclers, journalists, biographers, and hagiographers. Second, thi erature is very short on political analysis of the war and long on chronicles military operations, especially the heroic feats of the Israeli fighters. Third, t erature maintains that Israel's conduct during the war was governed by highe standards than that of her enemies. Of particular relevance here is the precept haneshek or the purity of arms, which posits that weapons remain pure provi are employed only in self-defense and provided they are not used against in civilians and defenseless people. This popular heroic-moralistic version of the war is the one that is taught in Israeli schools and used extensively in the qu legitimacy abroad. It is a prime example of the use of a nationalist version of in the process of nation building.
Until recently this standard Zionist version of the events surrounding the b the State of Israel remained largely unchallenged outside the Arab world. Th tieth anniversary of the birth of the state, however, witnessed the publicatio number of books that challenged various aspects of the standard Zionist version. First in the field, most polemical in its tone, and most comprehensive in its scope, was Simha Flapan's, The Birth of Israel: Myths and Realities. A former director of the Arab Affairs Department of the left-wing Mapam Party and editor of the Middle East monthly, New Outlook, Flapan wrote his book with an explicit political rather than academic aim in mind: to expose the myths that he claimed served as the basis of Israeli propaganda and Israeli policy. "The myths that Israel forged during the formation of the state," writes Flapan, "have hardened into this impenetrable and dangerous ideological shield."3 After listing seven myths, to each of which a chapter in the book is devoted, Flapan frankly admits the political purpose of the whole exercise. "It is the purpose of this book to debunk these myths, not as an academic exercise but as a contribution to a better understanding of the Palestinian problem and to a more constructive approach to its solution."4
Other books that were critical in their treatment of the Zionist rendition of events, salem has suggested as alternative terms prehistory and history. But th slightly less offensive toward the first category of historians. So, for lack o word, I shall use the label "old" to refer to the proponents of the standard version of the 1948 war and the label "new" to the recent left-wing critics version, including myself. The first thing to note about the new historiography is that much of it is Many of the arguments that are central to the new historiography were ad long ago by Israeli writers, not to mention Palestinian, Arab, and Western To list all these Israeli writers is beyond the scope of this article, but a few might be appropriate. One common thread that runs through the new histor is a critical stance toward David Ben-Gurion, the founder of the State of Isra its first prime minister. Whereas the old historians tend to view Ben-Guri resentative of the consensus among the civilians and military elites, the ne rians tend to portray him as the driving force behind Israel's policy in particularly the policy of expelling the Palestinians. Many of the recent cr of Ben-Gurion, however, are foreshadowed in a book written by the forme historian of the Israel Defense Forces (IDF), Lieutenant-Colonel Israel Ba he was in prison after being convicted of spying for the Soviet Union.8 A significant start in revising the conventional Zionist view of British p ward the end of the Palestine Mandate was made by Gavriel Cohen in a volu a characteristically old-fashioned title-Hayinu Keholmim, "we were as dream Yaacov Shimoni, deputy-director of the Middle East Department in the For istry in 1948, published a highly perceptive article on the hesitations, doub vations, and differences of opinion that attended the Arab decision to inte Palestine in May 1948.10 This article, which is at odds with the dominan narrative, is all the more noteworthy for having been written by an insider wrote another corrective to the notion of a monolithic Arab world, focusin ticular on the conflict between King Abdullah of Jordan and the Palestinia Zionist version about the causes of the Palestinian refugee problem was call question by a number of Israeli writers and most convincingly by Rony Ga Finally, the argument that Israel's commitment to peace with the Arabs did the official rhetoric can be traced to a book published under a pseudonym members of the Israeli Communist Party.13
Although many of the arguments of the new historiography are not new, a qualitative difference between this historiography and the bulk of the earl ies, whether they accepted or contradicted the official Zionist line. The dif in a nutshell, is that the new historiography is written with access to the of raeli and Western documents, whereas the earlier writers had no access, or only partial access, to the official documents. This is not a hard and fast rule; there are many exceptions and there are also degrees of access. Nevertheless, it is generally true to say that the new historians, with the exception of the late Simha Flapan, have carried out extensive archival research in Israel, Britain, and America and that their arguments are backed by hard documentary evidence and by a Western-style scholarly apparatus.
Indeed, the upsurge of new histories would not have been possible without the declassification of the official government documents. Israel adopted the British thirty-year rule for the review and declassification of foreign-policy documents. If this rule is not applied by Israel as systematically as it is in Britain, it i rather more liberally. Both Britain and Israel have also started to follow the can example of publishing volumes of documents that have been professiona lected and edited. The first four volumes in the series of Documents on the Policy of Israel are an invaluable and indispensable aid to research on the 194 and the armistice negotiations that ended it.14 On the Arab side, there is no equivalent of the thirty-year rule. In the rel Arab archives little access to materials on the 1948 war is allowed, and this r tion does pose a serious problem to the researcher. It is sometimes argued th definitive account of the 1948 war, least of all an account of what happened the scenes on the Arab side, is possible without proper access to the Ar archives. But difficulty should not be construed as impossibility. In the firs some official Arab documents are available. A prime example is the repor Iraqi parliamentary committee of inquiry into the Palestine question, w packed with high-level documents.15 Another example is the collection of of semiofficial, and private papers gathered by the Institute for Palestine Stud addition, there is a far from negligible literature in Arabic that consists of fi accounts of the disaster, including the diaries and memoirs of prominent po and soldiers.17 But even if none of these Arabic sources existed, the other av sources would provide a basis for an informed analysis of the 1948 war. A m historian of the Middle Ages would be green with envy at the sight of the sou available to his contemporary Middle Eastern counterpart. Historians of the war would do much better to explore in depth the manifold sources that are able to them than to lament the denial of access to the Arab state archives.
If the release of rich new sources of information was one important reason behind the advent of historical revisionism, a change in the general political climate was another.18 For many Israelis, especially liberal-minded ones, the Likud's ill-conceived and ill-fated invasion of Lebanon in 1982 marked a watershed. Until then, Zionist leaders had been careful to cultivate the image of peace lovers who would stand up and fight only if war was forced upon them. Until then, the notion of ein breira, of no alternative, was central to the explanation of why Israel went to war and a means of legitimizing her involvement in wars. But while the fierce debate between supporters and opponents of the Lebanon War was still raging, Prime Minister Menachem Begin gave a lecture to the IDF Staff Academy on wars of choice and wars of no choice. He argued that the Lebanon War, like the Sinai War of 1956, was a war of choice designed to achieve national objectives. With this admission, unprecedented in the history of the Zionist movement, the national consensus round the notion of ein breira began to crumble, creating political space for a critical reexamination of the country's earlier history.19
The appearance of the new books on the 1948 war excited a great deal of interest and controversy in Israeli academic and political circles. In support of this claim, Teveth quotes a passage from Benny Morris's article on "The New Historiography," a passage that states that "how one perceives 1948 bears heavily on how one perceives the whole Zionist/Israeli experience. ... If Israel was born tarnished, besmirched by original sin then it was no more deserving of that [Western] grace and assistance than were its neighbours." Teveth goes on to say that the original sin with which Shlaim charges Israel consists of "the denial to the Palestinian Arabs of a country," while Morris charges Israel with "creating the refugee problem" and both charges "are false."22
Teveth must have gone through the two books in question with a fine-tooth comb to discover evidence of the political motive that he attributes to their authors, but he came up with nothing. This is why he was reduced to quoting from the Tikkun article, which he builds up, in a farrago of distortions of his own, into the political manifesto of what he calls "the new historical club." But even the quote from the article does not demonstrate any political purpose; all it does is to point out that Western attitudes toward Israel are influenced by perceptions of how Israel came into the world. This is surely undeniable. Benny Morris replied in Ha'aretz and in a second article in Tikkun that, as far as he is concerned, the new historiography has no political purposes whatsoever. The task and function of the historian, in his view, is to illuminate the past.23 My own view is that the historian's most fundamental task is not to chronicle but to evaluate. The historian's task is to subject the claims of all the protagonists to rigorous scrutiny and to reject all those claims, however deeply cherished, that do not stand up to such scrutiny. In my view many of the claims advanced by the old historians do not stand up to serious scrutiny. But that does not mean that everything they say is untrue or that Israel is the sole villain of the piece. In fact, neither Benny Morris nor I have charged Israel with original sin. It is Shabtai Teveth who, in face of all the evidence to the contrary, con to cling to the doctrine of Israel's immaculate conception.24
It is Teveth's counterattack that is politically motivated. Like so many other bers of the Mapai old guard, he is unable to distinguish between history and paganda. Any attempt to revise the conventional wisdom with the help evidence that has come to light is therefore immediately suspect as unpatrio calculated to harm the reputation of the leader and the party who led the st for independence. For Teveth and other members of the Mapai old guard, th in question do not yet fully belong to history but represent their party's an country's finest hour. They are too wedded, personally and politically, to th version of the creation of the State of Israel to be able to treat the new hist phy with an open mind.
Interestingly, individuals on the political right in Israel, whether scholars respond to the findings of the new historiography with far greater equanimi readily admit, for example, that Israel did expel Palestinians and even expres that she did not expel more Palestinians since it was they who launched against her. Right-wingers tend to treat the 1948 war from a realpolitik poin rather than a moralistic one. They are therefore spared the anguish of trying oncile the practices of Zionism with the precepts of liberalism. It is perhaps reason that they are generally less self-righteous and more receptive to dence and new analyses of the 1948 war than members of the Mapai old guard latter put so much store by Israel's claim to moral rectitude that they cannot to the evidence of cynical Israeli double-dealings or brutal expulsion and dispossession of the Palestinians. It is an axiom of their narrative that Israel is the innocent victim. And it is their concern with the political consequences of rewriting history that largely accounts for the ferocity of their attacks on the new historiography.
Although politics and history have gotten mixed up in the debate about 1948, and although this debate often resembles a dialogue of the deaf, the very fact that a debate is taking place is a welcome change from the stifling conformity of the past. A. J. P. Taylor once remarked that history does not repeat itself, it is historians who repeat one another. The old historiography on the emergence of Israel is a striking example of this general phenomenon. As for the new historiography, whatever its faults, it at least has the merit of stimulating a reexamination of time-hallowed conventions.
Six major bones of contention can be identified in the ongoing debate between the new and the old historians: Britain's policy at the end of the Palestine Mandate, the Arab-Israeli military balance in 1948, the origins of the Palestinian refugee problem, the nature of Israeli-Jordanian relations during the war, Arab war aims, and the reasons for the continuing political deadlock after the guns fell silent. Let me now review briefly the main arguments and counterarguments on these six key issues in the debate, bearing in mind that I am not a detached or neutral observer but one of the protagonists in the debate. Ilan Pappe, using English, Arabic, and Hebrew sources, has driven a coach and horses through the traditional Zionist rendition of British policy toward the end of the Mandate, and I tried to follow along the trail that he has blazed.25 The key to British policy during this period is summed up by Pappe in two words: Greater Transjordan. Bevin felt that if Palestine had to be partitioned, the Arab area could not be left to stand on its own but should be united with Transjordan. A Greater Transjordan would compensate Britain for the loss of bases in Palestine. Hostility to Hajj Amin al-Husayni, who had cast his lot with the Nazis during World War II, and hostility to a Palestinian state, which in British eyes was always equated with a Mufti state, were important and constant features of British policy after the war. By February 1948, Bevin and his Foreign Office advisers were pragmatically reconciled to the inevitable emergence of the Jewish state. What they were not reconciled to was the emergence of a Palestinian state.
The policy of Greater Transjordan implied discreet support for a bid by Abdullah-nicknamed "Mr. Bevin's little king" by the officials at the Foreign Office-to enlarge his kingdom by taking over the West Bank. At a secret meeting in London on 7 February 1948, Bevin gave Tawfiq Abul Huda, Jordan's prime minister, the green light to send the Arab Legion into Palestine immediately following the departure of the British forces. But Bevin also warned Jordan not to invade the area allocated by the U.N. to the Jews. An attack on Jewish state territory, he said, would compel Britain to withdraw her subsidy and officers from the Arab Legion. Far from being driven by blind anti-Semitic prejudice to unleash the Arab Legion against the Jews, Bevin in fact urged restraint on the Arabs in general and on Jordan in particular. Whatever sins were committed by the British foreign secretary as the British Mandate in Palestine approached its inglorious end, inciting King Abdullah to use force to prevent the emergence of a Jewish state was not one of them.
If Bevin was guilty of conspiring to unleash the Arab Legion, his target was not the Jews but the Palestinians. The prospect of a Palestinian state was pretty remote in any case because the Palestinians themselves had done so little to build it. But by supporting Abdullah's bid to capture the Arab part of Palestine adjacent to his kingdom, Bevin indirectly helped to ensure that the Palestinian state envisaged in the U.N. partition plan would be stillborn. In short, if there is a case to be made against Bevin, it is not that he tried to abort the birth of the Jewish state but that he endorsed the understanding between King Abdullah and the Jewish Agency to partition Palestine between themselves and leave the Palestinians out in the cold.
The Zionist charge that Bevin deliberately instigated hostilities in Palestine and gave encouragement and arms to the Arabs to crush the infant Jewish state thus represents almost the exact opposite of the historical truth as it emerges from the British, Arab, and Israeli documents. The charge is without substance and may be safely discarded as the first in the series of myths that have come to surround the founding of the State of Israel. During the unofficial phase of the war, from December 19 the Yishuv gradually gained the upper hand in the struggle opponents. Its armed forces were larger, better trained, and advanced. Despite some initial setbacks, these advantages ena decisively the battle against the Palestinian Arabs. Even wh mitted their regular armies, marking the beginning of the o the Yishuv retained its numerical superiority. In mid-May t troops, both regular and irregular, operating in Palestine 25,000. The IDF fielded 35,000 troops, not counting the s settlements. By mid-July the IDF fully mobilized 65,000 m tember the number rose to 90,000, and by December it r The Arab states also reinforced their armies, but they could increase. Thus, at each stage of the war, the IDF significant Arab forces ranged against it, and by the final stage of the was nearly two to one.26
The IDF's gravest weakness during the first round of fighting in May-June w in firepower. The Arab armies were much better equipped, especially with arms. But during the first truce, in violation of the U.N. arms embargo, Israel ported from all over Europe (especially from Czechoslovakia) rifles, machine gu armored cars, field guns, tanks, airplanes, and all kinds of ammunition in quantities. These illicit arms acquisitions enabled the IDF to tip the scales d sively in its own favor. In the second round of fighting the IDF moved on to t offensive, and in the third round it picked off the Arab armies and defeated t one by one. The final outcome of the war was thus not a miracle but a faithful flection of the underlying Arab-Israeli military balance. In this war, as in wars, the stronger side ultimately prevailed.
THE ORIGINS OF THE PALESTINIAN REFUGEE PROBLEM
A third bone of contention between the old and the new historians concerns the origins of the Palestinian refugee problem. The question is: Did they leave or were they pushed out? Ever since 1948 Israeli spokesmen have maintained that the Palestinians left the country on orders from their own leaders and with the expectation of a triumphant return. Accounts written by old historians echo the official line. Arab spokesmen have with equal consistency maintained that Israel forcibly expelled some 750,000 Palestinians from their homes and that Israel, therefore, bears the full responsibility for the creation of the Palestinian refugee problem. The question of origin is thus directly related to the question of responsibility for solving the Palestinian refugee problem. Arab claims that the notion of forcible "transfer" is inherent in Zionism, and that in 1948 the Zionists simply seized the opportunity to displace and dispossess the Arab inhabitants of the country, rendered this controversy all the more acrimonious.
Benny Morris in his book The Birth of the Palestinian Refugee Problem investigated this subject as carefully, dispassionately, and objectively as it is ever likely to be investigated. Morris found no evidence of Arab leaders issuing calls to Palestine's Arabs to leave their homes and villages or any trace of a radio or press campaign urging them to flee. On the Israeli side, he found no blanket orders handed down from above for the systematic expulsion of the Palestinians. He therefore rejected both the Arab order and the Jewish robber-state explanations. His muchquoted conclusion is that "The Palestinian refugee problem was born of war, not by design, Jewish or Arab. It was largely a by-product of Arab and Jewish fears and of the protracted, bitter fighting that characterized the first Arab-Israeli war; in smaller part, it was the deliberate creation of Jewish and Arab military commanders and politicians."27 Benny Morris has already replied in detail to Teveth's criticisms, and it would serve no useful purpose for me to give a blow-by-blow account of the battle between them.28 But it seems to me that Teveth's position on the origins of the Palestinian refugee problem is about as sophisticated as the old saying, haya ness vehem nassu-there was a miracle and they ran away. Anyone who believes that will believe anything.
Another category of critics of Benny Morris's book consists of Israeli Orientalists. Some Orientalists, like Yehoshua Porath, have been highly supportive. Others, like Asher Susser, Emmanuel Sivan, and Avraham Sela, have written in a more critical vein while giving credit where credit is due. The recurrent criticism from this professional quarter is that Morris has made very little use in his book of Arabic sources. In response to this criticism, Morris posed a question: would the consulting of the Arabic materials mentioned by the critics have resulted in a fundamental revision of the analysis of the Palestinian exodus or added significantly to the description of this exodus given in his book?29 Avraham Sela concedes that the use of the Arabic sources would probably not have changed the main conclusions of Morris's study on the causes of the Palestinian exodus. But he goes on to argue that neglect of the available Arabic sources and heavy reliance on the Israeli documents is liable to produce an unbalanced picture.30
While a number of Israeli Orientalists hold that Morris attached too much weight to Israeli actions, compared with other factors, in the creation of the Palestinian refugee problem, many other reviewers felt that in his conclusion Morris lets Israel off rather lightly. An observation that is frequently made, by Western as well as Palestinian reviewers, is that the evidence presented in the body of the book suggests a far higher degree of Israeli responsibility than that implied by Morris in his conclusion.31 But despite the shortcomings of Morris's conclusion, his book remains an outstandingly original, scholarly, and important contribution to the study of a problem that lies at the heart of the Arab-Israeli conflict.
ISRAELI-JORDANIAN RELATIONS
A fourth issue that gave rise to a lively controversy in Israe Jordanian relations and, more specifically, the contention t Agency to partition Palestine at the expense of the Palestinians. The thesis also detracts from the heroic version that pictures Israel as ringed by an unbroken circle of Arab hostility and having to repel a concerted all-out attack on all fronts. Not surprisingly, the official history of the War of Independence fails to even mention the unwritten agreement with King Abdullah.35 Even when this agreement is acknowledged, the official line is that Abdullah went back on it at the critical moment and that it consequently had no influence, or only a marginal influence, on the conduct of the war.36
Regurgitating the official line, Shabtai Teveth hotly denies that the Jewish leaders were involved in collusion or had an ally on the Arab side. He coyly admits that "Israel and Jordan did maintain a dialogue" but goes on to argue that "at most theirs was an understanding of convenience.... There was nothing in such an understanding to suggest collusion designed to deceive a third party, in this case the Palestinian Arabs."37 Again, anyone who believes this will believe anything. If all that transpired between Israel and Jordan was a dialogue, then it was a rather curious kind of a dialogue because it lasted thirty years, because it was clandestine, because it was directed against a common rival, and because money changed hands. That the dialogue broke down between May and August 1948 is not in doubt. But surely, if one takes a long-term view of this relationship, "strategic partnership," if not "unholy alliance," would be a more appropriate term than a dialogue.
Teveth is evidently so wedded to the doctrine of Israel's immaculate conception that he is totally impervious to any evidence that contradicts it. He has made up his mind, and he does not want to be confused by the facts. His article provides a fine example of the absurd lengths to which the old historians are capable of going to suppress unpalatable truths about the way in which Israel came into the world. Judged by the rough standards of the game of nations, the dalliance between the Zionists and the Hashemite king was neither extraordinary nor particularly reprehensible. Both sides acted in a pragmatic fashion to advance their own interest. A problem arises only as a result of the claim that Israel's conduct was based on morality rather than self-interest.
The relations between Jordan and Israel in the 1948 war were reviewed recently by Avraham Sela in a 66-page article in Middle Eastern Studies. Sela's use of archival sources and his comprehensive examination of the literature on this subject, especially in Arabic, make this a valuable contribution to the historiography of the 1948 war. It does not lead me, however, to revise any of the arguments I advanced in Collusion across the Jordan. Sela's thesis is that "the conditions and basic assumptions that had constituted the foundations of the unwritten agreement between Abdullah and the Jewish Agency regarding the partition of Palestine as early as the summer of 1946 were altered so substantively during the unofficial war (Dece 1947 -May 1948 as to render that agreement antiquated and impracticable.
I believe that despite all the changes, the earlier accord and the long history cooperation-going back to the foundation of the Amirate of Transjordan i continued to exert some influence over the conduct of the two sides during t Sela maintains that in the early part of the war, the two sides, and especially raeli side, behaved according to the old adage a la guerre comme a la guerr if this is a valid conclusion regarding Israel, it is emphatically not valid, in my in relation to Jordan. Although the accord was no longer binding and contact severed, each side-and especially Jordan-continued to pursue limited obje and acted with restraint toward the other until the war ended. Although they enemies at the height of the war, they remained in Uri Bar-Joseph's apt phras best of enemies."
In conclusion, Sela tells us that war is a complex and intricate phenomenon. This is indisputable. One reason for this complexity is that war involves both politics and the use of force. The old historiography deals mostly with the military side of the war. I tried to redress the balance by looking at the political side of the war and more particularly at the interplay between politics and strategy. Sela goes on to state that "The collusion myth implicitly assumes the possibility for both Zionist and Palestinian acceptance of the partition plan and its peaceful implementation."39 I assume nothing of the kind. On the contrary, precisely because the Palestinians rejected partition, I consider collaboration between Abdullah and the Jewish Agency to have been a reasonable and realistic strategy for both sides. In other words, I accept that in the period 1947-49 Israel had no Palestinian option or any other Arab option, save the Jordanian option. King Abdullah was the only Arab head of state who was willing to accept the principle of partition and to coexist peacefully with a Jewish state after the dust had settled. From March to April 1948 this understanding was subjected to severe strain as the Jews went on the offensive. In the period May-July 1948, the two sides came to blows. From Abdullah's postwar vantage point, this was merely a fitna, a family quarrel, and the Jews had started it. And after the initial outburst of violence, both sides began to pull their punches, as one does in a family quarrel.
There remains the question of whether the term "collusion" is appropriate for describing the relations between Abdullah and the Jewish Agency and later the State of Israel. Some of the criticisms of the book were directed at its title rather than its substance. It was for this reason that for the abridged and revised paperback version of the book I opted for the more neutral title, The Politics of Partition.40 In the preface to the new edition I explained that although I had dropped the offensive word from the title, I was still of the opinion that the Israel-Jordan linkup involved at least some of the elements associated with collusion: "it was held behind a thick veil of secrecy; its existence was hotly denied by the participants; it was directed against a third party; it involved more than a modicum of underhand scheming and plotting; and it was consciously and deliberately intended to frustrate the will of the international community, as expressed through the United Nations General Assembly, in favour of creating an independent Arab state in part of Palestine. But King Abdullah, who was given nominal command over in Palestine, wrecked this plan by making last-minute chan sending his army into Palestine was not to prevent the establis state, but to make himself master of the Arab part of Palestin venting the establishment of an independent Palestinian state. had done next to nothing to create an independent state, the A would have probably gone to Abdullah without all the scheming that is another matter. What is clear is that, under the comman Arab Legion made every effort to avert a head-on collision and of one or two minor incidents, made no attempt to encroach o cated to the Jewish state by the U.N. cartographers.
There was no love lost between Abdullah and the other Arab rulers, who suspected him of being in cahoots with the enemy. Abdullah had always been something of a pariah in the rest of the Arab world, not least because of his friendship with the Jews. Syria and Lebanon felt threatened by his long-standing ambition to make himself master of Greater Syria. Egypt, the leader of the anti-Hashemite bloc within the Arab League, also felt threatened by Abdullah's plans for territorial aggrandizement in Palestine. King Farouk made his decision to intervene in Palestine at the last moment, and against the advice of his civilian and military experts, at least in part in order to check the growth of his rival's power. There were, thus, rather mixed motives behind the invasion of Palestine. And there was no single sigence. The new historians believe that postwar Israel was more intransigent than the Arab states and that she consequently bears a larger share of the responsibility for the political deadlock that followed the formal ending of hostilities.43 Evidence to back the new interpretation comes mainly from the files of the Israeli Foreign Ministry. These files burst at the seams with evidence of Arab peace feelers and Arab readiness to negotiate with Israel from September 1948 onward. The two key issues in dispute were refugees and borders. Each of the neighboring Arab states was prepared to negotiate with Israel directly and prepared to bargain about both refugees and borders.
King Abdullah proposed an overall political settlement with Israel in return for certain territorial concessions, particularly a land corridor to link Jordan with the Mediterranean, which would have enabled him to counter Arab criticisms of a separate peace with Israel. Colonel Husni Zaim, who captured power in Syria in March 1949 and was overthrown four months later, offered Israel full peace with an exchange of ambassadors, normal economic relations, and the resettlement of 300,000 Palestinian refugees in Syria in return for an adjustment of the boundary between the two countries through the middle of Lake Tiberias.44 King Farouk of Egypt demanded the cession of Gaza and a substantial strip of desert bordering on Sinai as his price for a de facto recognition of Israel. All three Arab rulers displayed re- were even anxious to preempt one another because they assumed that whoeve tled up with Israel first would also get the best terms. Zaim openly declared bition to be the first Arab leader to make peace with Israel. In each case, though for slightly different reasons, David Ben-Gurion consi the price being asked for peace as too high. He was ready to conclude peace on basis of the status quo; he was unwilling to proceed to a peace that involve than minuscule Israeli concessions on refugees or on borders. Ben-Gurion diary reveals, considered that the armistice agreements with the neighboring states met Israel's essential needs for recognition, security, and stability.45 H that for formal peace agreements Israel would have to pay by yielding substa tracts of territory and by permitting the return of a substantial number of Pa refugees, and he did not consider this a price worth paying. Whether Ben-Gu made the right choice is a matter of opinion. That he had a choice is now und
The controversy surrounding the elusive peace is examined in a book by Ita Rabinovich, former Rector of Tel Aviv University and one of Israel's leading on modern Arab politics. The title of the book, inspired by a poem by Robert is The Road Not Taken: Early Arab-Israeli Negotiations. This title implies that failure of these talks was not inevitable, that there was another road lead peace-the road not taken. But the book does not advance any thesis nor does i gage directly in the debate between the old and the new historians. Rabinovic fers to remain above the battle. So reluctant is he to assign blame, that his boo without an explicit conclusion. All he would say is that "the choices of 1 were made by Arabs, Israelis, Americans and others. The credit and responsib for them belong to all."46 Rabinovich's implicit conclusion, however, is that b of the instability of the Arab regimes, Ben-Gurion was justified in his refusa sume any political risks for the sake of peace. Yet in every crucial respect Ra ovich's account undermines the claim of the old historians that Israel encountered total Arab intransigence and confirms the revisionist argument that Israeli intransigence was the much more serious obstacle on the road to peace.47 CONCLUSION This article is concerned with the old Zionist version of the first Arab-Israeli war and with the challenge to this version posed by the new historiography. My conclusion is that the traditional version is deeply flawed and needs to be radically revised in the light of the new information that is now available. To put it bluntly, this version is little more than the propaganda of the victors. The debate between the old and the new historiography, moreover, is not of merely historical interest. It cuts to the very core of Israel's image of herself. It is for this reason that the battle of the historians has excited such intense popular interest and stirred such strong political passions.
The debate about 1948 between the old and the new historians resembles the American debate on the origins of the cold war. That debate evolved in stages. During the 1950s, the so-called traditionalist view held sway. According to this view, Soviet expansionism was responsible for the outbreak of the cold war, while American policy was essentially reactive and defensive. Then, in the context of the Vietnam war and the crisis of American self-confidence that accompanied school of thought emerged, a revisionist school of mostly younger, leftars. According to this school, the cold war was the result of the onward American capitalism, and it was the Soviet Union that reacted defensively ing the opening up of the archives, a third school of thought emerge revisionist school. A reexamination of the assumptions and argumen traditionalists and revisionists in the light of new evidence gradually yie revisionist synthesis. The hallmark of postrevisionism is not to alloca this party or the other but to try to understand the dynamics of the conf call the cold war.
The debate about the origins of the Arab-Israeli conflict seems to be following a similar pattern. A traditionalist school, consisting of participants and propagandists as well as historians close to the political establishment, laid the entire blame for the 1948 war and its consequences at the door of the Arabs. Then, following the opening of the archives, a new school of mostly left-wing historians began to reinterpret many of the events surrounding the creation of the State of Israel. These historians take a much more critical view of Israel's conduct in the years 1947-49 and place on her a larger share of the blame for the creation of the Palestinian refugee problem and for the continuing political impasse in the Middle East. The debate between the old and the new historians is bitter and acrimonious, and it is conducted in a highly charged political atmosphere. It is melancholy to have to add that there is no sign yet of the emergence of a postrevisionist synthesis. Battles between historians, like real battles, evidently have to run their course. 2Ibid., 35.
